

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~TST~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

February 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BERG ^{R.}
COLONEL WORTHMAN *w. 13 Feb*

Mr. [redacted] (formerly a professional staff member),
House Armed Services Committee has replaced [redacted]
[redacted] as counsel (#2 staffer) on this Committee.

[redacted] SAFLL called with this information and
suggested that we might want to brief him vice [redacted]. Mr.
[redacted] has been briefed DORIAN but has had no briefings in our
areas. [redacted]'s suggestion is based on some involve-
ment on [redacted] part last week in a review of the activities of
the 100th SW in which a good deal of the "soft shoe" routine was
employed. Mr. [redacted] chief involvement appears to be on re-
programming actions.

I will check this one out with [redacted]

y
WILLIAM R. YOST
Lt Colonel, USAF

*WHERE HAS [redacted] GONE? DEBRIEFED?
HIS IS A NEW NAME TO ME - WAS HE, IN HIS POSITION,
HELPFUL? IS IT A GOOD PLACE TO HAVE A CLEARED
TYPE?
I GOES I RAISE THE QUESTIONS ONLY SINCE HIS NAME
IS NEW TO ME!*

R.

DORIAN
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EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
ODD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

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[redacted] says -

If it goes thru Contingency
Appropriation, we will have
trouble - (rather than normal
aid construction)

This is what I gave

[redacted]

Chief Clerk,
Subcom on Mil
Construction in
response to query
from the [redacted]
Congressman. 4 Jan
10, 1969.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

June 16, 1969

MR

This statement prepared for Dr. Foster's
use in the FY 70 President's Budget discussions
on the NRP with Mr. Mahon's special group.

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Colonel Worthman

Every once in a while one finds that he has been led down the "old primrose path." It usually occurs with the seemingly earnest assertions of an individual with whom one has not had a number of dealings but with whom one is tremendously impressed. In these cases one can charge off the embarrassment to a first attempt.

However, when one is escorted down this path

by an individual whose
sincerity and credibility
has long been questioned,
one has only the
possibility of withdrawing
graciously.

I hereby withdraw
(graciously) to my
embarrassment. I'll
not bother you with
the details uncovered
in my check after-
the-fact.

Lt Col Yost
2/14/69

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Mr. Chairman

HIGHLIGHTS OF FY 69


1. Photographic Satellite Reconnaissance

The KH-4 program continued to provide surveillance coverage of all Soviet ICBM complexes, identifying new sites and giving the status of construction. The missile test ranges of the USSR and China were repetitively covered at a 10-foot ground resolution. Foreign nuclear test ranges were observed, with coverage providing information on

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IDEALIST
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preparations for underground nuclear tests, activity following test shots, as well as indications of future test plans. Communications facilities and air defense electronic facilities were covered on a high priority basis.

The KH-8 system provided high resolution coverage of thousands of specific nationally prioritized targets on each mission. Repetitive high resolution coverage of the new USSR Y-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine was obtained. Continued high resolution coverage of suspected Chinese advanced weapons related facilities was obtained. Numerous new identifications of Soviet single silo ballistic missile launching sites were recorded. The production of P-6 torpedo boats was repetitively observed at two major North Korean shipyards. Significant increases in Chicom ground force deployments along Chinese border areas were observed. Virtually complete updatings of the submarine orders of battle in both Soviet Pacific Fleet and Chicom Navy were accomplished.

2. SIGINT Satellite Reconnaissance

In my statement to you last year, I reported that additional emphasis in this area was being devoted to the collection of signals from ABM/AES installations in the USSR. We have continued this

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emphasis. On October 9, a high quality intercept provided the first indication of a possible DOG HOUSE tracking mode. On November 13, a Moscow [] radar was intercepted for the first time.

3. Aircraft Reconnaissance

On July 3, 1968 the Secretary of State suspended all IDEALIST U-2 aircraft missions, but subsequently approved a limited number of photographic and ELINT missions with the understanding that there would be no approach closer than 20 nautical miles to the Chinese mainland. During the last year ten peripheral missions have been flown. The photographic missions were targeted primarily on coastal areas in the Formosa Straits and Shanghai areas. ELINT missions were targeted against SAM sites in the same areas.

SAC U-2 operations included some 103 missions in SEA in support of COMUSMACV and tactical command requirements and some 53 missions over Cuba. The 147 type drones flew some 400 missions over North Vietnam concentrating generally on the highly defended areas of Hanoi and Haiphong and over South China.

SAC SR-71 operations included 69 missions in SEA.

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